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In China, twenty years of reform, which started precisely with the repudiation of 
egalitarianism and the encouragement to “get rich first”, has led to a serious interrogation 
of the ethics of wealth creation and accumulation. The issue of equity has become a 
subject of intense intellectual contestation in China, particularly in the recent debates 
between the liberals and the new left.1 For a society with a time-honoured tradition of 
putting emphasis on collective values, there is every reason for all parties in the dispute to 
claim concern for equity and selfless motivation in probing the question of social justice, 
although they are deeply divided in their assessment of the extent of inequalities in China 
today, especially in comparison to the Mao era; in their opinions about the origin of the 
current inequalities; and in their attitudes toward and remedies for them. This paper is an 
attempt to explore the complexity of contention between the left and the liberals, as well 
as the prospects for a third way for China. 
 
The Dilemma of the Left-on-the-Offensive 
 
The left in China today can be divided into the old left and the new left, though they 
share their love for parts of Maoism and their hostility toward capitalism. The old left is a 
fairly homogeneous group who are too rigid to make sense of changing realities and 
whose ideology is orthodox Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought,2 whereas the new 
left consists of at least three groups: post-modernists, populists and neo-nationalists.   
 
Contrary to the official ideology proclaiming the leading position of the proletarian class, 
the old left have painted a picture of a clear stratification in the current Chinese society 
where the working class is exploited by the petty bourgeoisie, bourgeoisie, bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie, comprador bourgeoisie and international bourgeoisie.3 In their view, “the 
1 The debate has focused on three themes: whether a critique of capitalism in China has become the task of 
the greatest urgency for Chinese intellectuals; whether China should pursue modernity as defined by the 
West; and whether “economic democratization should be prioritized over liberalism. For reports and 
comments, see Xu Jilin, ‘Qimeng de mingyun: ershi nian lai de zhongguo sixiang jie’ (The Fate of 
Enlightenment: The Chinese World of Thought in the Last 20 Years), Ershiyi Shiji (Twenty-first Century), 
1998:12,50, p. 3-13; Xu Jilin, Liu Jing, Luo Gang and Xue Yi) ‘Xunzhao “disantiao daolu”: guanyu 
“ziyouzhuyi” yu “xinzuoyi” de duihua’ (In Search for the “Third Way”: a Dialogue about “Liberalism” and 
“New-Left”), in Xu Jilin, Lingyizhong Qimeng (Another Kind of Enlightenment), Huacheng Chubanshe, 
1999, p. 276-302; Li Zehou, ‘Ziyoupai he mincuipai’ (Liberals and Populists), in Li Zehou, Bozhai Xinshuo 
(New Statements from the Boulder House), Hong Kong: Tiandi Tushu, 1999, p. 115-122; Geremie R 
Barmé, ‘The Revolution of Resistance’, in Elisabeth Perry and Mark Selden, eds., Social Change in 
Contemporary China: Conflict and Resistance, London: Routledge, 2000, p.198-220; and Yuan Weishi, 
‘Ziyouzhuyi lunzheng guankui’ (A Restricted View of the Debate on Liberalism), Kaifang Shidai (Open 
Times), 2000:2, p.37-45.  
2 The current old left has developed from the conservative wing of the party-state who were against market-
oriented reforms and opening to the outside world. Their spiritual leader is Deng Liqun and their main 
ideas have found expression in, and are best embodied by, several wanyanshu (a ten-thousand-word report 
prepared for perusal by the top leadership) and several ultra-left journals such as Dangdai Sichao (The 
Contemporary Ideological Trends), Gaojiao Lilun Zhanxian (The Theoretical Front of Higher Education), 
Wenyi Lilun Yu Piping (Literary Theory and Criticism), Zhenli de Zhuiqiu (In Quest of the Truth), and 
Zhongliu (Midstream).   
3 Anonymous, ‘Yingxiang woguo guojia anquan de ruogan yinsu’ (Several Factors Concerning the 
National Security of Our Country’, in Shi Liuzi, ed., Beijing dixia “wanyanshu” (The Ten-thousand-word 
and Other Underground Writings in Beijing), Hong Kong: Mingjing Chubanshe,  1997, p.30-31.  
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blood and sweat of the working people are being used to nurture and feed a bourgeoisie” 
in China.4 They further attack the philosophical foundation of the current reforms based 
on the false assumption of “economic man”, an assumption leading to the betrayal of the 
socialist cause and a capitalist restoration.5 They do not hide their nostalgia for the 1950s 
and the early 1960s, when, according to their judgement, there was fast economic growth 
and little social inequality.6    
 
There is a delicate relationship between the old left and the current communist leadership 
in China. In terms of their defence of the current political order characterised by the 
communist leadership and the hegemony of communist ideology, they rely on each other 
for support. However, the old left are constantly annoying the current communist 
leadership with their wholesale dismissal of market reforms; their alarmist warning of an 
imminent catastrophe in the collapse of communist rule; and their insistence on the 
Marxist orthodoxy of class struggle, despite its alienation of a majority of the population.  
 
The new left share with the old left a disapproval of market reforms and the invasion of 
international capital, but the new left are armed with a much more up-to-date ideological 
arsenal. The nationalist faction mainly borrows theoretical weapons from post-colonial 
criticism and blames the invasion of Western goods, Western capital and Western values 
for the escalation, if not the creation, of inequalities and other vices in contemporary 
China.7 A slightly different agenda emphasises concern for “state capacity”. These 
approach sees not only China’s national pride and sovereign state power being sacrificed 
in an economy increasingly dependent on world capitalism, but also the dangers posed by 
the process of economic decentralisation undermining the fiscal, economic and political 
power of the central government to address inequalities in Chinese society and in 
maintaining national unity.8   The populist faction, mainly literary critics, spares no effort 
in exposing the “social polarization” (liangji fenhua), the “inequalities” (shehui bujun), 
and the “spiritual degeneration” (jingshen duoluo) brought about by market reforms and 
4 Jiang Chuan, ‘Siyouhua: yong laodong renmin de xuehan chongxin peizhi he yangfei yige zichanjieji’ 
(Privatisation: Using the Blood and Sweat to Nurture and Feed a Bourgeoisie), Dangdai Sichao  
(Contemporary Ideological Trends), No.5, 1990.  
5 Xin Mao (pseudonym), ‘Gaige he jingji ren’ (Reform and the Economic Man), in Shi Liuzi, ed., Beijing 
dixia “wanyanshu” (The Ten-thousand-word and Other Underground Writings in Beijing, Hong Kong: 
Mingjing Chubanshe, 1997, p.201-230. 
6 Ou Zhizhu, ‘Quanmin suoyou, quanmin jiewu ma?’ (Does Ownership by All People Mean Ownership by 
No-one?), Zhongliu (Midstream), No.4, 1998; Xin Mao (pseudonym), ‘Gaige he jingji ren’ (Reform and the 
Economic Man), in Shi Liuzi, ed., Beijing dixia “wanyanshu” (The Ten-thousand-word and Other 
Underground Writings in Beijing, Hong Kong: Mingjing Chubanshe,  1997, p. 206-207.   
7 For three most aggressive attacks, see Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang and Qiao Bian, Zhongguo keyi shuo 
bu (China Can Say No), Hong Kong: Mingbao Chubanshe, 1996; Li Xiguang, Liu Kang, et al, Zai 
yaomohua zhongguo de beihou (Behind the Scenes of Demonising China), Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui 
Kexue Chubanshe, 1996; and Fang Ning, Wang Xiaodong, Song Qiang, et al, Quanqiuhua yinying xia de 
zhongguo zhilu (China’s Road under the Shadow of Globalisation), Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 
1999. For wider discussions on nationalism in China today, see also Li Shitao, ed., Minzu zhuyi yu 
zhuanxing qi zhongguo de mingyun (Nationalism and the Fate of China in Transition), Shidai Wenyi 
Chubanshe, 2000.  
8 See, for example, Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, Zhongguo Guojia Nengli Baogao (Report on 
China’s State Capacity), Hong Kong: University of Oxford University Press, 1994 
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capitalist modernity.9 The post-modernist faction is the most sophisticated of the three. 
Borrowing neo-Marxism, post-modernism and post-colonial critique from the West, 
utilising class-based discourses, and raising the issues of social justice, class exploitation 
and the hegemony of global (western) capital, they have effectively problematised the 
Chinese quest for Enlightenment values (such as liberty, science and rationality), 
modernity and globalisation. 10     
 
If the Marxist or neo-Marxist critique of Chinese reality cannot be dismissed as entirely 
irrelevant, the critique is crippled by the lack of viable alternatives. The Chinese left, old 
and new alike, can combat the tendency toward inequality only by conceiving of models 
in the Maoist tradition, which have already been discredited thanks to the bankruptcy of 
state socialism not only in China but all over the world. The favourite model for the old 
left is Nanjie Village in Henan Province. Since 1984 this village has managed to achieve 
remarkable economic success through collective farming and development of enterprises, 
rather than implementing the national policy of the “household responsibility 
system”.11However, most Chinese are on the alert against the revival of some “Cultural 
Revolution legacies” in this village, such as cultivation of personal cults, small group 
political study and criticism, and the military training of employees.  
 
The new left are fond of talking about “systemic renovation” (zhidu chuangxin) and 
“Chinese modernity”, but the concrete programs they offer, such as “economic 
democracy” as demonstrated by the experience of the “people’s commune” and the 
“Charter of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company”,12 are nothing but Maoist fantasies cast 
aside by the current Chinese government and the public as a whole. The Chinese new left 
take delight in praising the practice of involving workers in management in the Mao 
period as the Chinese version of post-Fordism. However, even post-Fordist 
empowerment in the West via workers’ voluntary participation and teamwork is still 
more rhetoric than reality in breaking down the hierarchy of management, not to mention 
the lack of any meaningful effect of forced participation in Mao’s China on addressing 
the unequal distribution of power in the workplace.  
 
9 For a typical example, see Han Yuhai, ‘Zai ziyou zhuyi zitai de beihou’ (Behind the Liberal Pose), Tianya 
(Frontiers), No.9, 1998; Han Yuhai, ‘Women shifou yao jieshou yige tongzhihua shijie’ (Do We Need to 
Accept the World of Uniformity”, Ershiyi Shiji (Twenty-first Century), 1999:8; Han Yuhai, ‘Ziyouzhuyi de 
lilun pinfa’ (Poverty of the Liberalist Theory), Yazhou Yuekan (Asia Monthly), 2000:1. See also Liang 
Xiaosheng, Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieceng Fenxi (An Analysis of Social Strata in China), Jingji Ribao 
Chubanshe, 1997.  
10 Wang Hui, ‘Dangdai zhongguo sixiang zhuangkuang yu xiandaixing’ (The State of Thought in 
Contemporary China and Modernity), Tianya (Frontiers), 1997:5, p.133-150; Wang Hui, ‘Guanyu 
xiandaixing wenti dawen’ (Questions and Answers about Modernity), Tianya (Frontiers), 1999:1.   
11 Wang Yuli, ‘Najie bushi meng: Wang Hongbing he cunminmen de tanshuo’ (Nanjie Is Not A Dream: 
Exploration By Wang Hongbing and His Fellow Villagers), Zhongliu (Midstream), No.7, 1994..   
12 Cui Zhiyuan, ‘Zhidu chuangxin yu dierci sixiang jiefang’ (Systemic Renovation and the Second Mind 
Emancipation), Ershiyi Shiji (Twenty-first Century), 1994: 8; Cui Zhiyuan, ‘Mao Zedong “wenge” lilun de 
deshi yu “xiandaixing” de chongjian (The Success and Failure of Mao’s Cultural Revolution Theory and 
the Reconstruction of Modernity), Xianggang Shehui Kexue Xuebao (Hong Kong Journal of Social 
Sciences), Spring 1996, no.7, p.49-74; Cui Zhiyuan, ‘Angang xianfa yu hou futezhuyi’ (The Charter of 
Anshan Iron & Steel Company and Post-Fordism), Zhongguo yu Shijie (China and the World), 1997:1. 
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The Potential for Liberals-on-the-Defensive 
 
There is a so-called “economic liberalism” widely practised in China under reform. This 
brand of liberalism can be defined as development of a private economy under the 
guidance of authoritarian regime. It lays emphasis on the economics of the free market, 
but not, and sometimes at the expenses of, the politics of personal liberties. However, at 
the early stage of reform, there was a widely held belief in commodities as an “inherent 
equaliser” (tianshengde pingdengpai), as well as a common assumption that money and 
money only would be powerful enough to create a democratic, free and equal society by 
dismantling totalitarian political structures and power monopoly. Since the 1980s large 
proportion of the population has gone mad with “commodity fetishism” or “money 
fetishism” and has been vying with each other to “get rich first” by whatever means 
available. This kind of mentality and practice were occasionally coupled with theoretical 
justification, on the grounds that it was necessary for the transition to a market economy, 
civil society and democratic polity in China. Even in the 1990s, when power and money 
reinforced each other to foster a “power economy” based on annexation of public 
property and unequal competition, the rapid accumulation of wealth by power holders 
and their associates in this manner has led to serious social polarisation where the “super 
rich stratum” (baofu jieceng) contrasts sharply with the poor. Some scholars still insist 
that the best way to prevent the “erosion [appropriation] of state property” (guoyou 
zichan liushi) is to undertake privatisation in an open and orderly manner rather than 
shying away from privatisation and the development of personal wealth.13   
 
It is not surprising that Chinese liberals have been accused by some observers of ignoring 
inequalities and other evils brought about by the market economy,14 as liberals in China 
today wholeheartedly support the projects of marketisation, modernization, globalisation 
13 Zheng Yefu, ‘Fubai de zhengfu gongneng’ (Positive and Negative Functions of Corruption), Dushu 
(Reading), 1993:5; Zheng Yefu, ‘Shehui shengtai xue de fubai yu shehui zhuangui qi de fubai’ (Corruption 
in Social Ecology and Corruption in the Period of Social Transtion), Zhanlue Yu Guanli (Strategy and 
Management), 1994:3; Zhang Shuguang, ‘Fubai wenti de zai sikao’ (Rethinking on Corruption), Dushu 
(Reading), 1994:2; Zhang Shuguang, ‘Fubai yu huilu de jingji fenxi’ (An Economic Analysis on 
Corruption and Bribery), Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Jikan (China Social Sciences Quarterly), 1:6, February 
1994; Gong Xihui, ‘Yuqi toutoumomo wuguize de siyouhua, ningke yao gongkaiyouxude siyouhua’ (The 
Superiority of Privatisation in an Open and Orderly Manner Over Covert and Chaotic Privatisation’, in 
Zhang Wenmian, et al, eds, Zhongguo Jingji Dalunzhan (Debates on the Chinese Economy), Beijing: Jingji 
Guanli Chubanshe, 1996, p.91-92; Zhang Wushang, ‘Yi chanquan huan tequan, chujin siyouhua’ (Zhang 
Wushang on Promoting Privatisation Through Exchanging Privileges With Property), in Zhang Wenmian, 
et al, eds, Zhongguo Jingji Dalunzhan (Debates of Chinese Economy), Beijing: Jingji Guanli Chubanshe, 
Vol.2, 1997, p. 268-269; Zhang Weiyin, ‘Youxie fubaide cunzai, bushi zuihao ye shu ciyou’ (The 
Existence of Corruption to a Certain Degree Is Next to the Best If not the Best), in Zhang Wenmian, et al, 
eds, Zhongguo Jingji Dalunzhan (Debates on the Chinese Economy), Beijing: Jingji Guanli Chubanshe, 
Vol. 2, 1997, p.269-270. 
14 Xu Jilin, Liu Jing, Luo Gang and Xue Yi, ‘Xunzhao “disantiao daolu”: guanyu “ziyouzhuyi” yu 
“xinzuoyi” de duihua’ (In Search for the “Third Way”: a Dialogue about “Liberalism” and the “New-
Left”), in Xu Jilin, Lingyizhong Qimeng (Another Kind of Enlightenment), Huacheng Chubanshe, 1999, p. 
276-302; Li Zehou, ‘Ziyoupai he mincuipai’ (Liberals and Populists), in Li Zehou, Bozhai xinshuo (New 
Statements from the Boulder House), Hong Kong: Tiandi Tushu, 1999, p. 115-122. 
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and privatization.15 Nevertheless, the issue of equity is also of central concern to liberals, 
who in the recent debate with the new left have distanced themselves from “economic 
liberalism”, especially those who are strongly inclined to social democracy.16  Despite the 
fact that some leading liberals have made an appeal to return to the basics of classical 
15 Li Shenzhi, ‘Hongyang beida de ziyouzhuyi chuantong’ (Promoting and Developing the Liberal 
Tradition of Beijing University), preface to Liu Junning (ed) Ziyouzhuyi de Xiansheng: beida chuantong yu 
jinxiandai zhongguo (The Harbinger of liberalism: The Tradition of Beijing University and Modern China), 
Beijing: Zhongguo Renshi Chubanshe, 1998; Li Shenzhi, ‘Fengyu canghuang wushinian’ (The Sombre 
Fifty Years), Kaifang Zazhi (Open Magazine), 2000:2, p.34 – 39; Li Shenzhi and He Jiadong, Zhongguo de 
Daolu (The Road for China), Nanfang Ribao Chubanshe, 2000; Liu Junning (ed), Ziyouzhuyi de 
Xiansheng: beida chuantong yu jinxiandai zhongguo (The Harbinger of liberalism: The Tradition of 
Beijing University and Modern China), Beijing: Zhongguo Renshi Chubanshe, 1998; Liu Junning, 
‘Ziyouzhuyi: jiushi niandaide “busuzhike”’ (Liberalism: an “Unexpected Guest” of the 1990s), Nanfang 
Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), 29 May 1999; Zhu Xueqin, ‘1998 ziyouzhuyi xueli de yanshuo’ (The 
Discourse on Liberalism in China in 1998), in Lu Yuming, et al, Xueshuo Zhongguo (Theories in China), 
Jiangxi Jiaoyu  Chubanshe, 1999, p.202-224; Qin Hui, ‘Zhongguo xiandai ziyouzhuyi de lilun shangque’ 
(A Theoretical Deliberation on Liberalism in Modern China), in Qin Hui, Wenti Yu Zhuyi (Issues and 
Isms), Changchun Chubanshe, 1999, p. 116-133; Qin Hui, ‘Zhongguoshi de “xin zuopai” lilun bianxi’ (The 
Theory of the “New-Left” with Chinese Characteristics: An Analysis), in Qin Hui, Wenti Yu Zhuyi (Issues 
and Isms), Changchun Chubanshe, 1999, p. 156-176;  and Wang Dingding, ‘Zhongguo jiushi niandai 
gaigede zhengzhi jingjixue wenti’ (Issues of Political Economy for Reform in China in the 1990s), Ershiyi 
Shiji (Twenty-first Century), 1999:6, p.23-29; Wang Dingding, ‘Ziyou: yiduan jiaotashidi de xushuo’ 
(Liberty: an Earnest and Down-To-Earth Narrative), in  Li Shitao (ed), Ziyou zhuyizhizheng yu zhongguo 
sixiangjie de fenhua (The Debate on Liberalism and the Split in the Chinese World of Thought), Shidai 
Wenyi Chubanshe, 2000, p. 362-368; Xu Youyu, ‘Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo’ (Liberalism and 
Contemporary China), Kaifang Shidai (Open Times), 1999:3, p.43-51; Yuan Weishi, ‘Ziyouzhuyi lunzheng 
guankui’ (A Restricted View of the Debate on Liberalism), Kaifang Shidai (Open Times), 2000:2, p.37-45. 
16 There are twists and turns in using the term social democracy in history. Marx and Engles preferred the 
term communism, but they also tolerated social democracy because it was widely used by the proletarian 
parties in Europe. At the turn of the 19th and 20th century a communism-social democracy split took place 
and from then on the two terms referred to two different things. Whereas communism referred to the 
political ideology and movement to achieve socialism through the violent “proletarian revolution” and the 
“proletarian dictatorship”, social democracy referred to the political ideology and movement for  an 
evolutionary transition of society from capitalism to socialism through legal and peaceful processes, the 
process of election in particular. In the Declaration of Principles unanimously adopted by the Socialist 
International in 1951 the term “democratic socialism” was chosen to replace social democracy, with an aim 
to register a complete opposition to communist totalitarianism and a compromise with the capitalist camp. 
Most parties transformed from communist parties in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the 
late 1980s have also chosen the term “democratic socialism” to describe their new ideology. In reality, by 
the 1950s the ideology of social democracy had been revised to the extent that the project to replace the 
capitalist society with the socialist society was abandoned in favor of reforms within the capitalist 
framework, and, as a consequence, there was no meaningful distinction between the two terms of social 
democracy and democratic socialism. The Chinese translation of “Social democracy” is “minzhu shehui 
zhuyi”, and that of “democratic socialism” is “minzhu shehui zhuyi”. As in the West, nowadays the two 
terms “minzhu shehui zhuyi” and “shehui minzhu zhuyi” are interchangeable in China. Furthermore, in my 
opinion, the Chinese liberals in contemporary China can be further divided into two sub-groups, namely the 
group of liberals such as Li Shenzhi, Liu Junning and Zhu Xueqin, who concentrate on the promotion of 
individual liberty, and the group of social democrats, such as Qin Hui, He Qinglian and Xu Jilin (who 
prefers to stay outside the liberal and new left camps), seeking to balance individual liberty with a strong 
welfare state. According to Qin Hui, there is a strong “overlapping consensus” between liberalism and 
social democracy in contemporary China and the differences between liberals and social democrats have 
not yet become an issue. See Qin Hui, ‘Ziyou zhuyi, shehui minzu zhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo “wenti”’, 
Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), 2000:5, p. 83-91.   
pre-published version
liberalism,17 and despite the fact that John Rawls’s emphasis on the right of the “least 
advantaged” has been challenged by fundamentalist liberals like Robert Nozick as 
equalising people’s achievements rather than their opportunities,18 most Chinese liberals 
today are true believers of John Rawls’s “two principles of justice”: “First: each person is 
to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty 
for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions 
and offices open to all.”19 Not only do Chinese liberals do their utmost in promoting 
market efficiency, liberty, democracy and the rule of law, they also take great pains in 
promoting social justice, even before the new left took up the issue; not only do they 
advocate equality of opportunity and procedural justice, they also stand for distributive 
justice to a great extent.20 As a matter of fact, the social democrat elements within the 
liberal camp in particular are closely following the tradition of utopian liberal political 
economy with great enthusiasm in the egalitarian mode of the liberal welfare state. 
 
However, Chinese liberals differ from both the Chinese old and new left in two 
fundamental ways in tackling the issues of equity and inequalities. First, the liberals see 
the authoritarian political system, as well as the resultant marketisation of political power 
in the process of transition to the market economy (rather than the market economy per 
se), as the primary source of inequality, including the unequal distribution of wealth. 
Based on the observation that power holders have abused their power to complete the 
17 For example, Liu Junning, ‘Beida chuantong yu jinxiandai zhongguo de ziyouzhuyi’ (The Tradition of 
Beijing University and Liberalism in Modern China),in Liu Junning (ed), Ziyouzhuyi de Xiansheng: beida 
chuantong yu jinxiandai zhongguo (The Harbinger of Liberalism: the Tradition of Beijing University and 
Modern China), Beijing: Zhongguo Renshi Chubanshe, 1998, p.1-11. See also Xu Youyu, ‘Chongti ziyou 
zhuyi’ (Bring Up Liberalism Again), in Xu Youyu, Ziyoude Yanshuo (Liberal Discourse), Changchun 
Chubanshe, 1999, p. 283-294; and Xu Youyu, ‘Ziyou zhuyi, falankefu xuepai ji qita’ (Liberalism, Frankfurt 
School and Others), conclusion, in Xu Youyu, Ziyoude Yanshuo (Liberal Discourse), Changchun 
Chubanshe, 1999, p. 317. 
18 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974. 
19 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, P.60 
20 Qin Hui (Bian Wu), ‘Gongzheng zhishang lun’ (On Supremacy of Justice), Dongfang (Orient), 1994:6; 
Qin Hui (Bian Wu), ‘Zailun gongzheng zhishang: qidian gongzheng ruhe keneng’ (The Second Essay On 
Supremacy of Justice: Possibility of Justice at Starting Point), Dongfang (Orient), 1995:2; Qin Hui (Bian 
Wu), ‘Gongzheng, jiazhi lixing yu fan fubai: sanlun gongzheng zhishang’ (Justice, Value Rationality and 
Anti-corruption: the Third Essay on Supremacy of Justice), Dongfang (Orient), 1995:6; Qin Hui (Bian 
Wu), ‘Gongzheng wei daode zhiji’ (Justice as the Foundation of Morality: the Fourth Essay on Supremacy 
of Justice), Dongfang (Orient), 1996:5; Qin Hui, ‘Shehui gongzheng yu xueshu liangxin’ (Social Justice 
and Academic Conscience), in Li Shitao (ed), Ziyou zhuyizhi zheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenhua 
(Debate on Liberalism and the Split in the Chinese World of Thought), Shidai Wenyi Chubanshe, 2000, p. 
388-396; Qin Hui, ‘Shehui gongzheng yu zhongguo gaige de jingyan jiaoxun’ (Social Justice and the 
Lessons of Refrom in China), in  Qin Hui, Wenti yu Zhuyi (Issues and Isms), Changchun Chubanshe, 1999, 
p. 33-40; Qin Hui, ‘Ziyou zhuyi, shehui minzu zhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo “wenti”’, Zhanlue yu Guangli 
(Strategy and Management), 2000:5, p. 83-91; He Qinglian, Xiandaihuade Xianjing (The Pitfall of 
Modernisation), Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1998; Xu Youyu, ‘Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo’ 
(Liberalism and Contemporary China), Kaifang Shidai (Open Times), 1999:3, p.43-51; Xu Youyu, ‘Ziyou 
zhuyi, falankefu xuepai ji qita’ (Liberalism, Frankfurt School and Others), in Xu Youyu, Ziyoude Yanshuo 
(Liberal Discourse), Changchun Chubanshe, 1999, p. 305-318; Zhu Xueqin, ‘1998 ziyouzhuyi xueli de 
yanshuo’ (Discourse on Liberalism in China in 1998), in Lu Yuming, et al, Xueshuo Zhongguo (Theories in 
China), Jiangxi Jiaoyu  Chubanshe, 1999, p.202-224. 
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process of “primitive capital accumulation”, He Qinlian comes to the conclusion that 
unfair distribution in China today does not manifest itself in the distribution of national 
income [through wages or taxes], but mainly in the allocation and possession of 
resources, especially the unfair distribution of power.21  
 
“Current social evils in China”, argues another liberal Zhu Xueqin, “cannot be simplified 
and equated with a ‘western disease’ and ‘market disease’. They are a ‘Chinese disease’ 
and a  ‘power disease’ resulting from the peculiar circumstances where the market 
mechanism is parasitised, distorted, and even suppressed by an outmoded power 
mechanism. The liberals raised the issue of social justice long before the new left did, and 
they dug deeper to the root of the problem, pointing out that the problem already existed 
in the Mao era, such as in the plunder of private property, possession of public property 
and suppression of different political views by the privileged stratum. These social 
injustices took shape from the inception of that system, but had been covered by Mao’s 
illusory ideology of egalitarianism. The power mechanism has not changed with the 
introduction of the market mechanism but has increased its privileges and augmented the 
scope of rent-seeking. Hence there is structural corruption and unprecedentedly acute 
social injustice in our society”.22  
 
Second, instead of waging an all-out war against the market, capitalism and the “middle 
class” as the left did, the liberals firmly defend the market, capital and the “middle class” 
while focusing their attacks on the unjust power structure of the party-state and the 
“upstarts” (baofahu) getting rich through the abuse of political power in one way or 
another. Xu Youyu complains that “the new left pick up other people’s phrases to attack 
marketisation, ignoring the positive effect of marketisation in breaking down the 
oppressive old system”. According to him, what should be done is to protect the interests 
of working people against “bigwig privatisation” (quangui siyouhua) through the creation 
of a just legal framework to regulate the market and human behaviour.23  
 
Qin Hui argues, since social injustice in China today is rooted in an unfair process of 
competition where some are abusing political power to create and accumulate wealth 
while others are losing out, “what is important is that there should be a simultaneous 
process of taking away both the constraints and protection of the old system, avoiding 
thereby the consequences in which some people continue to enjoy protection after taking 
away the constraint and others continue to suffer from the constraint after losing the 
21 He Qinglian, Xiandaihuade Xianjing (The Pitfall of Modernisation), Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo Chubanshe, 
1998, P.4. 
22 Zhu Xueqin, ‘Ziyouzhuyi yu xin zuopai fenqi hezai’, ‘What Is the Difference Between the Liberals and 
the New Left’, in Zhu Xueqin, Shuzai li de geming (Revolution Within the Study), Changchun Chubanshe, 
1999, p.419-420. There are those who argue that state socialism cannot be reformed and market socialism 
is an illusion, simply because market coordination and bureaucratic coordination and not compatible. See 
Janos Kornai, The Socialist System: the Political Economy of Communism, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992.  
23 Xu Youyu, ‘Jiushi niandai de shehui sichao’ (Intellectual Trends in the 1990s), in Xu Youyu, Ziyoude 
Yanshuo (Liberal Discourse), Changchun Chubanshe, 1999, p. 257, 260. 
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protection, that the opportunities are monopolised by the former whereas the risks are 
taken by the latter, and that the former take the ‘fruits’ whereas the latter pay the price”.24  
 
Zhu Xueqin summarises the liberal solution in combating the social evils of equality as 
follows: “Liberalism aims to deepen market-oriented reform while opposing any attempt 
to plunder, in the name of economic reform, the social wealth accumulated from the 
contributions by lower strata of the society, and opposing any attempt to repeat the 
experience of Land Reform and Boxer-style false nationalism. Twenty years of economic 
reform has not been accompanied by corresponding political reform to balance power, 
hence the problem of the accumulation of social injustice. The only way out is to 
establish constitutional democracy and the rule of law through political reform, rather 
than falling back to the trap of campaigns and mass movements of the past”.25 
 
Public Discourse  
 
The contestation between liberals and the new left on the issue of equity epitomises the 
controversy in Chinese society as a whole. This is simply because China is still a closed 
society where access to information is difficult and many politically sensitive issues are 
forbidden zones for academic enquiry; it is hard to assess the real extent of inequality, let 
alone its causes. Public discourse on social stratification and the disparity between the 
rich and the poor in particular has become fashionable in China since the early 1990s. 
There is no consensus on social categories in China today. One study, following the 
official line, divides Chinese society into nine categories: workers in state enterprises, 
workers in urban collective enterprises, workers in “other enterprises”, peasants, 
individual labourers, private owner-operators, intellectuals, cadres, and the poor (urban 
and rural).26 Another study makes use of twelve categories: business people, officials, 
peasants, blue collar workers, white collar workers, intellectuals, ordinary urbanites 
(shimin), free professionals (ziyou zhiyezhe), the floating population, students, celebrities, 
and itinerants (jianghu).27  Yet another study further divides society into fifteen classes 
and strata:  blue collar workers, white collar workers, intellectuals, officials, unemployed 
people, retirees, peasants, workers in rural enterprises, rural cadres and intellectuals, 
peasant-workers and the floating population, individual labourers, private owner-
operators, managers, soldiers, and students.28  
 
24 Qin Hui, ‘Shehui gongzheng yu xueshu liangxin’ (Social Justice and Academic Conscience), in Li Shitao 
(ed), Ziyou zhuyizhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenhua (Debate on Liberalism and the Split in the 
Chinese World of Thought), Shidai Wenyi Chubanshe, 2000, P.395-396. 
25 Zhu Xueqin, ‘1998 ziyouzhuyi xueli de yanshuo’ (Discourse on Liberalism in China in 1998), in Lu 
Yuming, et al, Xueshuo Zhongguo (Theories in China), Jiangxi Jiaoyu  Chubanshe, 1999, p.213. 
 
26 Zhong Ming and Wang Yu, Liangji Honggou? Dangdai Zhongguo de Pingfu Jieceng (Polar Gap? The 
Poor and Rich Strata in Contemporary China), Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 1999.    
27 Wu Junping and Xu Yin, Wo Shi Cui: Dangdai Zhonguoren de Shehui Dingwei (Who Am I: Social 
Identification of Chinese Today), Neimenggu Renmin Chubanshe,1997.   
28 Zhu Guanglei, et al, Dangdai Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieceng Fenxi (An Analysis of Social Strata in 
Contemporary China), Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1998.  
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On the surface, it appears that extensive empirical research has been performed to assess 
the gap between rich and poor. Widely employed techniques to determine the extent of 
difference between rich and poor include the Gini-coefficient to measure difference in per 
capita income among the entire population, and the “five grades division” to compare the 
proportion of family income in five groups. Commonly cited findings include the 
following: the Gini-coefficient of per capita urban income in China increased from 0.15 
in 1978 to 0.37 or even as high as 0.59 in 1994; in 1994 the income of the top 20% of 
families accounted for 50.14 % of the total national income (compared to 44.3% in the 
United States in 1990), whereas the bottom 20% of families accounted for 4.27% of total 
national income (compared to 4.6% in the United States in 1990); conspicuous 
consumption by thousands of millionaires contrasts sharply with the hardship of millions 
of people struggling below the poverty line; and there are huge differences in income 
between rural and urban residents, between different regions and between different 
professions.29 
 
Useful as it is, these standard approaches cover up the truth as much as they reveal, 
simply because the real situation in China is anything but standard. Calculation based on 
income tax in China is bound to be inaccurate due to the fact that income tax has only just 
been introduced over the last several years in China and that substantial “grey income” 
and “black money” have never been included in the formula. Worse still, calculation of 
formal salary income can be very misleading in assessing social difference and inequality 
in Mao’s China, where social status was determined by “political life” rather than 
personal income or wealth, and officials of the party-state acquired innumerable goods 
and services without any payment, often even legally. Based on the calculation of formal 
salary income, one could allege that economic inequality hardly existed in the People’s 
Republic during the Mao era but has become increasingly salient since the 1980s.30 This 
assertion is less than adequate if we take into account the financial worth of the office and 
political power (quanli de hanjinliang) at each level of government, and particularly the 
free mansions, cars, servants, special supply shops and other privileges and services 
allocated to high-ranking officials.  
 
Political and social inequality was of course much more serious than economic inequality 
in Mao’s China. Nowadays there are many popular sayings describing social stratification 
in China. The popular expression “ten classes of citizens” (shideng gongmin) is one of 
the most popular among these. It vividly divides citizens in contemporary China into ten 
classes, particularly identifying officials who benefit three generations of their families 
and the ordinary people (laobaixing) who make sacrifices for the “revolution”.31  
29 For details see He Qinglian, Xiandaihuade Xianjing (The Pitfalls of Modernisation), Beijing: Jinri 
Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1998, P.235-236; Zhong Ming and Wang Yu, Liangji Honggou? Dangdai 
Zhongguo de Pingfu Jieceng (Polar Gap? The Poor and Rich Strata in Contemporary China), Zhongguo 
Jingji Chubanshe, 1999, p. 31-33; and Yang Yiyong, et al, Gongping yu Xiaolu: Dangdai Zhongguo de 
Shouru Fenpei Wenti (Equity and Efficiency: the Problems of Income and Distribution in Contemporary 
China), Jinri Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1997.    
30 See, for example, Zhu Guanglei, et al, Dangdai Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieceng Fenxi (An Analysis of 
Social Strata in Contemporary China), Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1998, p. 591-592.  
31 Chu Jian and Zuo Yu, Dangdai Shunkouliu yu Shehui Redian Shaomiao (Popular Sayings in 
Contemporary China and A Survey of Public Concerns), Beijing: Dangan Chubanshe, 1994, p.176. There 
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However, that in Mao’s China there existed a strict social hierarchy dividing individuals 
according to one’s social status and class label allocated by the party-state should not be 
ignored. Firstly there was a demarcation line clearly separating the “people” from the 
“class enemy” (landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, rightists, 
etc) who were condemned to the status of untouchable in the People’s Republic. Then 
there was an unbridgeable gap between urban and rural China regulated by the hukou 
system, an elaborate administrative structure that bound the peasantry, a caste of low 
status, to their birthplace and excluded them from employment in the urban state sector 
and from welfare benefits available for urban residents. Within the category of urban 
resident, people were further divided into categories of cadre and worker, and the latter 
into state and collective workers, with very clear implications for access to job 
placement, social security and welfare benefits. Lifetime job security, generous pensions, 
free housing, free medical care and other welfare benefits did exist in Mao’s China, but 
they were granted exclusively to the "revolutionary cadres" and workers in the state 
sector at the expense of the rest of society. Absence of private wealth did not prevent 
“revolutionary cadres” in Mao’s China from enjoying various privileges and even a 
luxurious lifestyle far beyond the reach of ordinary people. The gap between officialdom 
and the public in the People’s Republic was not less salient than that in imperial China. 
There will be no social equality in the world if a society of this sort is regarded as equal 
and fair. 
     
Current studies on social stratification in China invariably focus on the emergence of a 
super rich stratum and reveal a strong social sentiment of envy towards them. This strong 
sentiment of envy is reflected in the following two phrases: “seeking to be rich but 
immoral” (weifu buren) and “those who should not be rich are getting rich but those who 
should be rich are not” (gaifu de bu fu, bugai fu de dao fu liao). One study describes the 
“image” of private owner-operators in the following ways: seeking wealth by devious 
means, low level of education, manufacturing and selling fake goods for staggering 
profits, badly treating employees, as well as bribing officials and bending the laws.32 
Another study concentrates on the “disparity between wealth and knowledge” and 
complains about the fact that a majority of business people in the private sector only have 
a secondary or lower level of education whereas “intellectuals” with a higher level of 
education are particularly poor.33 But this study does not explain why those 
“intellectuals” who exclusively serve an oppressive state with little benefit for society as 
a whole should be better rewarded by the market. However, there are also more sensible 
assessments that those who are getting rich by abusing political power or other illegal 
means should be distinguished from those who are getting rich through fully legitimate 
means, and that there are those who used to be the least advantaged but have been 
“forced” to take the opportunities to get rich first.34  
are several versions of this popular saying, see also Lu Wen, Baixing Huati: Dangdai Shunkouliu (Subject 
Topic for Ordinary People: Current Popular Sayings), Beijing: Dang’an Chubanshe, 1998, p.188, 247-248. 
32 Zhu Guanglei, et al, Dangdai Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieceng Fenxi (An Analysis of Social Strata in 
Contemporary China), Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1998, P.391-393. 
33 Xu Xiangyang, Chuanxing Qi Zhongguo de Kunhuo: Lun Caifu yu Zhishi de Fenli (A Puzzle of China in 
Transition: the Disparity between Wealth and Knowledge), Beijing: Huaxia Chubanshe, 1998. 
34 Yuan Zhizhong, Guozhong Zhiguo: Zhongguo Geti Jingjiquan Shehui Toushi (State Within State: A 
Perspective on the Private Economy in China), Jinan Daxue Chubanshe, 1992. See also Zhong Ming and 
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Prospects for a Third Way 
 
As argued elsewhere, the search for the “third way”, a combination of socialism and 
democracy, has been under way in China for a century.35 For the last hundred years, 
several generations of modernizing Chinese elites have been trying their best to follow 
the latest international trends, especially when imports like the socialist sub-culture of the 
West can satisfy their “surpassing [the West] complex” (ganchao qingjie) and national 
pride as well as their interpretation of the national need for development. It is the power 
struggle between ambitious political leaders of different political persuasions, more than 
anything else, that has prevented the rise and the success of social democracy in China. 
Now that a fundamental transformation, through an intertwined process of marketisation, 
democratisation and globalisation, seems to be a prevailing trend among developing 
countries all over the world, be they right-wing authoritarian societies or former 
communist societies, there is little wonder then that the Chinese should have renewed 
interest in social democracy, which is thought to be superior to capitalism by virtue of 
simultaneously boosting production and improving the livelihood of the people. 
 
In the early 20th century, social democracy shared the same goal with communism in 
replacing capitalism with socialism, but differed from communism in advocacy of  
achieving socialism through elections and other lawful democratic means, as opposed to 
the means of violent revolution promoted by communists. However, the trajectory of the 
development of social democracy has been a history of moderation or regression. By the 
1950s, when many socialist parties rose to power in the West, social democrats had given 
up their original belief in the abolition of capitalism, in replacing private ownership with 
public ownership, and in substituting central economic planning for free market 
competition, but concentrated rather upon nationalization of some key industries, 
establishment of the welfare state and the policy of full employment. Later, the doctrines 
of nationalization and full-employment were also abandoned. In its current form, defined 
as the “third way”, it is moving toward a convergence with neo-liberalism, but differs 
from the latter in that in continues to defend some essential parts of the welfare state 
(such as social security and universal medical care) and insists on state regulations 
enshrining the rights of trade unions and equitable distribution of wealth. Social 
democracy has been successful to a certain degree in the West, not so much as an 
alternative to capitalism but as a supplementary device for managing and regulating 
capitalism for the benefit of society as a whole, including the working class. Democratic 
socialists have been the true heirs to the European Enlightenment and the champions of 
democracy. Among other things they have fought for the abolition of entrenched interests 
and privileges of the old regime. Mainly to the credit of social democracy, capitalism as 
known by Marx has been revised and transformed almost beyond recognition. 
 
Wang Yu, Liangji Honggou? Dangdai Zhongguo de Pingfu Jieceng (Polar Gap? The Poor and Rich Strata 
in Contemporary China), Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 1999, p. 54-58.    
35 Feng Chongyi‘A Century’s Search for the Third Way: A Historical Perspective of Social Democracy in 
China’, presented at Internationalisation and Identity Workshop, Sydney, 26-28 November 2000.  
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The temptation to construct social democracy in China is real indeed. For one thing, 
social democracy can be an ideal way for China to deal effectively with the tangled 
problems of inefficiency and inequality. And the trajectory of transformation of 
communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has indicated that while 
communism is absolutely out of date, fully-fledged capitalism is neither a desirable nor 
viable way for a society where a smooth and fair operation of market mechanisms will 
still take an extended period of time to properly function, where many socialist values 
have been kept alive among the population but social disparity is escalating due mainly to 
an authoritarian power structure, and where the “primitive accumulation complex” has 
generated tremendous resentment threatening social stability. The Chinese transition to a 
market economy has passed the point of no return. The real problem lies in the difficulty 
of the transition to democracy, which, hopefully, will help to nurture and maintain some 
socialist values and keep some evils of market competition in check. While the party-
state has much at stake during the transition to democracy, Chinese society as a whole 
has a profound fear of chaos that might result from democratization, a chaos experienced 
recently by the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.36 However, apart from the fact 
that democracy has intrinsic value in promoting a decent life, regardless of its economic 
and other functions, and apart from the fact that democracy has demonstrated its 
effectiveness in maintaining long term social stability necessary for economic 
development in the long term, democratisation seems the only effective way to minimize 
inequality in the transition to the market economy from the communist system.  
 
Interest in social democracy has been on the rise in China since the mid-1990s. The 
Chinese are of course familiar with social democracy. Major publications by social 
democrats in the West and, recently, in Eastern Europe, have long been available in 
Chinese. However, the recent interest in social democracy has been stimulated by the 
predicament of reform at home and the debate on the “third way” abroad, particularly in 
the works of Anthony Giddens.37 There is an unprecedented tendency to regard the ideas 
of social democracy as a source for inspiration and of solutions for the problems in 
36 As to the process of the transformation of the communist system, democracy proved to be neither 
necessary nor sufficient for good economic performance, simply because economic results are determined 
by economic policies as much as by the form of government. There are successful examples of 
democratisation with healthy economic development, such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia (part of the 
former Yugoslavia); there are disappointing examples of democratisation with a collapsing economy, such 
as Russia and Ukraine; there are confusing examples of rapid economic development without 
corresponding democratisation, such as China and Vietnam; and there are also examples of economic 
collapse without democratisation, such as North Korea and many other former communist countries before 
the grand transformation. For a very useful summary, see Michael Intriligator, ‘Democracy in Reforming 
Collapsed Communist Economies: Blessing or Curse?’, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol.16, No.2, 
April 1998, p. 241-246. 
37 Chen Lin and Lin Deshan, eds., Disantiao Daolu: Shiji Zhijiaode Xifang Zhengzhi Biange (The Third 
Way: Political Change in the West at the Turn of Century), Dangdai Shijie Chubanshe, 2000; Yang 
Dongxue, ‘Disantiao daolu: xinlu haishi jiutu’ (The Third Way: Is It New or Old), in Yang Xuedong and 
Xue Xiaoyuan, eds., “Disantiao Daolu” yu Xin Lilun (The Third Way and New Theories), Shehui Kexue 
Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000, p. 1-21. Ge Tingting and Zhu Hong, ‘Andongni-Jidengsi chanshu disantiao 
daolu: yizhong xinde shehui zhengzhi linian’ (Anthony Giddens’ Talk on the Third Way: A New Concept 
of Society and Politics’ , Zhongguo Gaige Bao, 20 October 1998; Zhang Rulun, ‘Disantiao daolu’ (The 
Third Way), Dushu (Reading), No.4, 1999; Wang Zhenhua, ‘Cong Kesuowo zhanzheng kan “disantiao 
daolu”’ (“The Third Way from the Perspective of the War in Kosovo), Renmin Ribao, 6 August 1999. 
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China. Some establishment intellectuals, as well as liberal intellectuals, have argued that 
social democracy should not be rejected in the first place because “scientific socialism” 
was originally known as social democracy; that by definition social democracy means 
socialism plus democracy, two of the fully legitimate goals for the official ideology; that 
social democracy has proven to be the best method for the developed capitalist world to 
achieve socialism; and that social democracy has been effectively adapted to the 
changing environment of the world.38 There is even a rumor that a debate has taken place 
within the party leadership about whether the party should transform itself into a social 
democratic party. Jiang Zemin’s recent “idea of three representations” (sange daibiao 
sixiang) is said to abandon the definition of the CCP as “the vanguard of the proletarian 
class” and change the nature of the party in line with social democracy.39 A change of 
this kind can be regarded as a major revolution in thought. Closely following the Leninist 
tradition, the CCP treated social democracy or any brand of “revisionism” as the “most 
dangerous enemy” up until the early 1990s, more dangerous than capitalism because it 
was seen to be capable of subverting communism from within. During the early 1990s in 
particular, and mostly blaming the revisionist shift to social democracy for the collapse of 
communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the CCP leadership had 
every reason to maintain sharp vigilance against the rise of that ideology in China. It 
seems at least some academics and some communist leaders in China are able to 
understand social democracy and the drastic change in the former communist camp with 
reasonable calm, now that the dust of the change has largely settled with a new Russia 
and Eastern Europe emerging from the economic crisis. China, by contrast, has been 
experiencing the agony of a halfway reform, including the conflicts of the smooth 
operation of a market economy and the outmoded power structure of the party-state, 
systemic corruption and inefficiency, and the legitimacy crisis of communist rule and 
Marxist ideology.40      
 
According to Qin Hui, China is still at the stage where the “liberal order” (ziyou zhixu) 
has not yet been established. Therefore, the basic values of liberalism, social democracy, 
38 Xu Chongwen, Minzu Shehuizhuyi Pingxi (Analysis on Social Democracy), Chongqing: Chongqing 
Chubanshe, 1995, p.2; Chen Lemin, ‘Miandui lilunde kunjing: ben shiji shehui minzuzhuyi de sange shiqi 
(In the Face of Theoretical Predicaments: Three Stages of Social Democracy in this Century), in Chen Lin 
and Lin Deshan, eds., Disantiao Daolu: Shiji Zhijiaode Xifang Zhengzhi Biange (The Third Way: Political 
Change in the West at the Turn of Century), Dangdai Shijie Chubanshe, 2000, p.123-129; Yan Xuyu, et al, 
‘Guanyu zhuanxing zhong de shehui minzuzhuyi de duihua’ (A Dialogue on Social Democracy in 
Transition’, in Chen Lin and Lin Deshan, eds., Disantiao Daolu: Shiji Zhijiaode Xifang Zhengzhi Biange 
(The Third Way: Political Change in the West at the Turn of Century), Dangdai Shijie Chubanshe, 2000, 
p.130-157; Yan Xuyu and Xiang Wenhua, ‘Su dong jubian yu shehui zhuyi de mingyun’ (The Fate of 
Socialism and Drastic Change in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), in Xian Wenhua, ed, Shiji 
Mo de Sikao (Thinking at the End of the Century), Zhongyang Bianyu Chubanshe, 1998, p. 153-168; 
Huang Anbiao and Xiang Wenhua, ‘Qingzhe zi qing, zhuozhe zi zhuo (The Evil and the Virtuous Can 
Never Be Mixed), Xian Wenhua, ed, Shiji Mo de Sikao (Thinking at the End of the Century), Zhongyang 
Bianyu Chubanshe, 1998, p. 169-181. 
39 Xianggang Xinbao (date?). Jiang’s “idea of three representations” sees the CCP representing the interest 
of the whole people in China, the most advanced production forces, and the most advanced culture of the 
world.  
40 For the most sophisticated study in Chinese on the change of the former Soviet Union, see Gong Dafei, et 
al, eds., Sulian Jubian Xintan (A New Inquiry into the Drastic Change in the Soviet Union), Shijie Zhishi 
Chubanshe, 1998.   
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and even classic socialism are not incompatible, not least because they are facing the 
same enemy of despotism and populism and they are defending the “same bottom line” 
(gongtong dixian) defined by human rights, liberty and procedural justice.41 In a society 
where for several decades the population has been fed with the assertion that liberalism 
will only lead to inequality, social division and exploitation, especially when “economic 
liberalism” backed by bureaucratic power turns public property worth millions of dollars 
into private assets every day, social democracy might be seen as the best choice, if the 





In terms of the current debate between Chinese liberals and the new left, the liberals stand 
much closer to social democracy, although these two groups need not be irreconcilable 
enemies. Chinese true believers of liberalism want nothing less than a legal framework 
for the protection of property rights, personal freedoms and the smooth operation of the 
market economy, but they also pay much attention to equality and the well-being of the 
poor stratum and social justice in general. The liberals and the new left in China should 
not be confused with their nominal counterparts in the West. Different stages of 
economic, political and social development render completely different meanings of the 
same terms in China and the West. Whereas liberals in the contemporary West are a 
conservative force with vested interests in an inequitable economic order, Chinese 
liberals constitute a revolutionary force seeking to transform the party-state which 
monopolises both power and wealth; whereas the left in the contemporary West is a 
progressive force attempting to champion the interests of the poor and the weak, the new 
left in China is in danger of lending its services to the party-state by diverting concerns 
away from an exploitive and repressive power structure and blaming market forces for 
social injustice.42 
 
The core of the debate on the issue of equity in China today is whether the state or the 
market should be afforded greater power. It has taken several decades for the Chinese, in 
fact, for people from across the entire communist camp, to realise that communist 
officialdom (guanchang) is much worse than the market (shichang) in boosting the 
economy and, to some at least, in bringing about social justice and equality. That is why 
the Chinese have set off down a road of no return toward a market economy. History 
seems to be on the side of Chinese liberals, who insist that the authoritarian political 
system and an inadequate development of the market economy are the main sources of 
social inequality and other social evils in contemporary China, and that the future of 
China lies in the market economy and liberal democracy embodied by the West. In the 
West, where there is a mature market economy and civil society, it might be necessary to 
balance the market with state power, especially in protecting the less advantaged. But the 
welfare state in the West, or even the “developmental state” or “entrepreneurial state” in 
41 Qin Hui, ‘Ziyou zhuyi, shehui minzu zhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo “wenti”’, Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy 
and Management), 2000:5, p. 83-91. 
42 For useful analysis on the left in the West, see Willie Thompson, The Left in History: Revolution and 
Reform in Twentieth-Century Politic, London: Pluto Press, 1997. 
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newly industrialised market economies, is not to be confused with the “totalitarian state” 
or “party-state” with unlimited power over personal property and personal life in the 
communist world. There is no doubt that the market contains within it both emancipating 
and dominating forces, but the market has played quite a positive role in China in the last 
two decades in boosting the economy and reducing inequalities at the same time. In 
delaying the introduction of democratic reforms to break down the hierarchical power 
system that allows political power holders and their associates to plunder much of the 
public property during the transition to a market economy, the Chinese have missed the 
best chance to provide an equal start for everyone in the marketplace. Resolute remedial 
measures need to be taken in order for the Chinese to benefit more from the dynamics 
and the liberating potential of the market while limiting its tendency to produce 
inequality and the commercialism detrimental to a healthy life.  
 
After all, the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and 
the emergence of a quite new global economy and politics have rendered irrelevant much 
of the conventional left-right polarities based on the capitalism-socialism divide.  The old 
concepts, such as capitalism and socialism, with their purity and militant certainty, are no 
longer desirable or viable for Chinese aspirations nor, for that matter, for understanding 
China, which may transform into a creative ambiguity with a mixed economy - in which 
the non-state sectors will play the dominant role even if the state sector is not wiped out 
completely - and with a “mixed politics” in which liberal democracy is supplemented by 
social democracy. Of course this is not to suggest that there is great optimism about the 
prospects for social democracy in China. Even if there is a consensus emerging in China, 
the project of social democracy will still face tremendous difficulties, as an expert on the 
history of the left has put it: “Social democracy’s principal strength has been manifested 
in advanced industrial societies – ones where the largest social surplus has been available 




43 Willie Thompson, The Left in History: Revolution and Reform in Twentieth-Century Politics, London: 
Pluto Press, 1997, p. 153-154. 
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